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Abstract
We propose a tamper-evident storage system based on
probe storage with a patterned magnetic medium. This
medium supports normal read/write operations by out-
of-plane magnetisation of individual magnetic dots. We
report on measurements showing that in principle the
medium also supports a separate class of write-once
operation that destroys the out-of-plane magnetisation
property of the dots irreversibly by precise local heating.
We discuss the main issues of designing a tamper-evident
storage device and file system using the properties of the
medium.
1 Introduction
Tampering with data is a problem because it affects many
businesses and organisations [11]. The culprits include
everyone from the casual hacker who tries to obliter-
ate the trace of his actions, to the CEO and his accoun-
tant who destroy vital evidence [10]; and the stakes are
high [20]. As a result, laws such as the US Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) [37] and the EU data reten-
tion directive [49] have been introduced to create a legal
framework in which to deal with tampering.
To deal with tampering on a technical level a large va-
riety of disk, tape, and optical Write Once Read Many
(WORM) technologies have been developed that are de-
signed [15] to resist or at least to help detect tampering.
Unfortunately, tamper resistance is a hard problem [3]
that none of the existing storage technologies actually
provide. For example, there is nothing to stop a dedi-
cated attacker from tampering with a Read-only Memory
(ROM) [4]. On the other hand it is difficult to cover the
traces of tampering with a ROM. Mass storage such as
disk, tape and optical disk is probably just as easy to tam-
per with as ROM, so we believe that we should put our
efforts in improving the tamper evidence of mass storage.
It is always difficult to find the right balance between
security and usability, and tamper evidence of mass stor-
age is no exception to this rule. To guide the discussion
we analyse how mass storage is used. Probably most ap-
plications use a data base, which requires efficient ran-
dom reads and writes. Tampering with data is easy, as
any record can simply be rewritten. Therefore most data
bases support a snapshot operation that freezes the con-
tents of the data base, for instance for auditing purposes,
recovery, etc. If the snapshot is written to a disk, the at-
tacker will find it as easy to tamper with the snapshot as
it is easy to tamper with the live database. If on the other
hand the snapshot is written to an optical WORM device,
tampering would be more difficult to hide. Unfortunately
the WORM device also has an impact on the way the
snapshot can be read, as the performance characteristics
of hard disk and optical disk are different. An ideal so-
lution would combine the performance of the hard disk
with the tamper evidence of the optical disk. In other
words we require not a WORM device but a Selectively
Eventually Read-only (SERO) device, i.e., a device that
begins life as a Write Many Read Many (WMRM) de-
vice, selected parts of which are subjected to Write Once
(WO) operations, and which ends life as a Read-only
(RO) device.
The construction of a SERO device is still a long way
away, but in this paper we would like to lay the physical
foundation for the medium used in such a device, also
giving the design considerations for a device and a file
system that would support SERO storage. Our proposal
combines an idea of Molnar et al. [31] for tamper-evident
storage with our own work on patterned media. We in-
troduce each of these two elements below.
Molnar et al. [31] describe how standard Pro-
grammable Read-Only Memory (PROM) can be used to
build tamper-evident storage. The basic idea is to store
each bit of information in a cell occupying two bits us-
ing Manchester encoding: the logical bit 1 is encoded as
the cell 10 and the logical bit 0 is encoded as the cell 01.
The value 11 indicates a cell that has not yet been used
(all cells in a PROM are initialized to 11). The value
00 indicates a cell that has been tampered with for the
following reason. The physical properties of a PROM
make it impossible to change a 0 back into a 1 (except by
exposing the entire memory module to ultra violet light,
which would reset all cells to 11). Therefore, the only
way to tamper with information (which is encoded as 01
or 10) is to clear a bit. This immediately results in an in-
valid cell 00, which provides the evidence of tampering.
A patterned medium [52] consists of a regular arrange-
ment of magnetic dots separated by sub-micron distances
that can be magnetised in two directions along a fixed
magnetic axis. A magnetic dot can be read and written
magnetically any number of times. However, by precise
local heating of a dot, the orientation of the magnetic
axis of the dot can be changed irreversibly. The idea
is to use this feature to create a storage device that be-
gins life as a WMRM device, reading and writing dots
magnetically. After heating, a dot can no longer be read
or written magnetically, but the fact that a dot has been
heated can be detected. From then on the heated parts
of the medium operate as a tamper-evident RO device,
while the rest of the medium continues to operate as a
WMRM device. The ability to heat parts of the medium
incrementally provides flexibility that cannot be matched
by current WORM technology. (The operation we call
“heating” is usually called “freezing” in the literature,
but given the physical realisation of the operation we de-
cided to stay with the term heating.)
In the rest of the paper, we discuss the issues that must
be addressed for the combination of tamper-evident stor-
age and patterned media to result in a SERO device with
the following properties. Firstly, like a hard disk, the
device is expected to offer random WMRM access to a
large number of blocks with a total capacity of the or-
der of 1 Terabit [39]. Secondly, the device is expected
to be capable of a WO operation of a block by heating
the magnetic dots of the block. After the WO operation
the block is RO. We will also refer to the WO operation
of a block as heating a block. Finally, heating a block
is expected to be relatively slow. Therefore, the device
is expected to be able to heat a contiguous sequence of
blocks, henceforth referred to as heating a line, by (a)
calculating a secure hash of the line, and (b) applying a
WO operation on the first block of the line to record the
hash.
Our proposal does not use cryptographic keys. We
provide only data integrity (using secure hashing and
hardware support) but no confidentiality or authenticity.
Our proposal is thus complementary to the vast amount
of work on using symmetric and public key cryptogra-
phy to provide storage with confidentiality and authen-
ticity, and our work could be combined with many of the
existing approaches.
Contribution The contributions of the paper are (1) to
evaluate the feasibility of heating dots, and (2) to discuss
whether a tamper-evident probe storage device and file
system on a patterned medium are feasible. The paper
touches upon all the relevant aspects from regulatory is-
sues studied by lawyers down to material science studied
by physicists.
Related work is discussed in the next section. Then we
speculate on the feasibility of a device (Section 3), and
a file system (Section 4) for SERO storage. A security
analysis of the hypothetical SERO file system and device
is presented in Section 5. We describe concrete exam-
ples of an actuator (Section 6), and a medium (Section 7)
that could be used to build a SERO device. Section 8
discusses open issues. The last section concludes and
suggests further work.
2 Related work
We discuss related work in a top down fashion, starting
with the regulatory issues all the way down to material
science.
Regulatory issues The world of data storage goes
through a period of turmoil. Taylor [49] describes how
the EU data retention directive will increase the diffi-
culty of companies and organisations to comply with
the already burdensome laws and regulations. Hasan et
al. [17] describe the struggles and demise of Storage Ser-
vice Providers, largely due to regulations such as SOX,
while the business case for outsourcing data storage is
as strong as ever due to the rising Total Cost of Own-
ership (TCO). Hasan and Yurcik [16] discuss the effects
of disclosure legislation on companies, which stipulates
that storage security breaches must be reported, in some
cases even in public, on TV and in newspapers. The ef-
fect on the reputation of businesses affected can be dev-
astating. Tamper-evident storage is needed to help ad-
dress the problems.
Tamper evidence There are three basic approaches to
providing tamper evidence. The first and most com-
monly practiced approach relies on hardware support; for
example using Write Once Read Many (WORM) tech-
nology [5]. The main disadvantage is that WORM tech-
nology tends to be inflexible; data can only be written
once, while most applications (chiefly data bases) write
and rewrite data often until the moment has arrived to
take a snapshot for auditing and compliance purposes.
The second approach to providing tamper evidence re-
lies on a trusted third party (TTP) to provide notary ser-
vices [6], secure time stamps [26], etc. It is not always
2
practical to rely on a TTP; for example in mobile ap-
plications the TTP may not always be reachable. The
third approach either (a) distributes the data over many
servers, only some of which are assumed to be mali-
cious or faulty [2], or (b) uses many clients to control
the server. A good example of the latter is SUNDR [24],
in which each client keeps a record of his last trans-
action with the SUNDR server. This allows the client
to check whether his previous transaction has somehow
been “forgotten” by the server. This works fine as long
as all clients regularly check their last transaction, but the
mechanism is ineffective if this is not the case; for exam-
ple if most clients make only one transaction. SUNDR is
geared towards detecting tampering during data sharing;
in our work we do rely on others to detect tampering but
rely on hardware support.
All the approaches mentioned rely on something exter-
nal to system that is intended to deliver the secure store
(i.e., separate hardware, separate servers and/or separate
clients). Our approach relies on hardware support, while
improving the flexibility beyond what a typical WORM
system can offer.
WORM technologies Write-protect rings have been
used for 50 years on magnetic tapes to prevent accidental
overwriting of valuable data. There are many variations
on this idea to protect disks, tapes and optical media.
Physical WORM technologies using optical media and
tape are widely used. Optical WORM technologies of-
fer a high level of integrity but the cost of ownership is
higher than that of disk-based technologies. For exam-
ple CDROMs are cumbersome to manage (because they
have a small capacity, which leads to large collections of
CDs), and professional optical storage systems are ex-
pensive (because they often contain mechanical robots).
Tape based technologies are generally inexpensive but
offer integrity at the medium level only. For example
a tape cartridge in the Linear Tape-Open 3 (LTO-3) in-
dustry standard has a small semiconductor memory in
which a read-only flag can be set [21], such that a com-
pliant tape drive will refuse to write on such a cartridge.
The tape itself can still be written using a tape drive that
has been tampered with, or after tampering with the car-
tridge.
Software based WORM technologies are based on the
idea that the disk driver or the firmware of the disk can
be modified to block future writes to selected areas of
the disk. The integrity offered by this approach is rela-
tively weak, as software modifications can generally be
undone. There are many Virtual Tape Library products in
the market that depend on software based WORM tech-
nologies [55].
An IBM patent [56] proposes to connect the write sig-
nal of a disk head via a blowable fuse such that once the
fuse is blown, an entire disk platter becomes immutable.
This offers a high level of relatively coarse grained in-
tegrity. As in the case of the LTO-3 tape standard, the
platter is still writeable but it would be more difficult to
repair the fuse in the head than it is to tamper with an
LTO-3 tape drive.
Probe storage During the last ten years, several
recording systems based on probe microscopy technol-
ogy have been proposed. Leading research by IBM [39]
is followed by other companies such as HP [34], Sam-
sung [30], Seagate [23], LG [22] and a number of uni-
versities such as Carnegie Mellon, DSI Singapore, Ex-
eter, Tohoku, Twente, and Yonsei. Probe storage is also
being combined with disk storage [18].
Materials aspects To understand the details of the
modification of magnetic materials, background infor-
mation is given in section 6. For the following it is suf-
ficient to understand that the individual elements in the
patterned medium, the dots, have an easy direction of
magnetisation perpendicular to the film surface, rather
than in-plane. This is achieved by using a stack of ultra-
thin films (tens of layers, each thinner than 1 nm) of inter-
leaved magnetic and non-magnetic material. The many
interfaces between the magnetic and non-magnetic films
force the magnetisation perpendicular to those interfaces,
and therefore to the film.
The modification of the magnetic properties of a mul-
tilayered patterned medium is relatively easy. The first
experiments were performed with Ga ions from a Fo-
cussed Ion Beam [50], using modest irradiation doses.
The magnetic properties of the material are modified by
displacement of the interface atoms, and inclusion of Ga.
By using lighter ions, such as He+, the incorporation
of ions can be avoided, and only interface mixing re-
sults [41]. As a result, the easy axis of magnetisation
rotates from perpendicular to in-plane. By using shadow
masks to shield from the impingement of ions, these ir-
radiation techniques can be used to pattern multilayered
films into areas with perpendicular and in-plane magneti-
sation. These types of patterned medium have the advan-
tage that the surface remains flat.
In this work we suggest to use temperature-assisted in-
terface mixing to destroy magnetic dots selectively. On
the effect of heat treatment of multilayer materials, much
less is known, primarily because it is considered a detri-
mental effect that cannot be used for patterning. Encour-
aging experiments show however that at relatively low
temperatures of about 300 ◦C, interface mixing occurs
between Co (magnetic) and Pt (non-magnetic) [46]. Heat
treatment can however also have beneficial effects on the
interfaces. In Co/Cu systems for instance, the interfaces
are found to enhance at temperatures of 300 ◦C [7]. Most
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Figure 1: Above: dots are magnetised upwards or down-
wards; Below: destroyed dots have a perpendicular or
in-plane easy axis.
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Figure 2: The state transitions of one bit. H indicates
a heated bit, and 0/1 indicates a bit that has not been
heated.
likely this has to do with the solubility of both materi-
als. Therefore the material combination has to be chosen
with care. Even so, it is possible to damage the films
at higher temperatures. In the same Co/Cu system, at
700 ◦C grains start to grow and the Co layers start to co-
alesce, thus destroying the interface completely. From
these experiments we can conclude therefore that ther-
mal destruction of the magnetic properties by interface
mixing is in principle possible, provided that the right
material combination is chosen.
This concludes the survey of related work on all rele-
vant aspects of tamper-evident data storage.
3 Device
We argue that tamper evidence storage requirements can
be served flexibly by six high level sector operations,
which are built out of four low level bit operations. We
describe the bit operations first, followed by the sector
operations.
Magnetic bit operations We require magnetic read
and write operations for bits and a second set of elec-
trical read and write operations for bits. We discuss the
magnetic read and write operations first. In the normal
mode of operation we have a medium with a regular ma-
trix of magnetic single domain dots with a preferred axis
of magnetisation perpendicular to the medium. This is
illustrated in the top half of Figure 1, which shows the
substrate and three layered dots. The first and last are
magnetised in the upwards direction, the middle in the
downwards direction.
The magnetic write bit operation mwb sets the direc-
tion of the magnetisation (up is 1, down is 0) and the cor-
responding magnetic read bit operation mrb senses the
direction of the magnetisation. The signal measured by
the read heads is shown schematically, indicating a posi-
tive peak for the first and the last dot, and a negative peak
for the middle dot. The top half of Figure 2 illustrates the
transitions from 0 to 1 and vice versa, as effectuated by
the magnetic write operations on the state of an individ-
ual bit.
Electrical bit operations The second set of read and
write operations on bits has an electrical basis. The elec-
trical write bit operation ewb heats an individual dot by
means of an electric current flowing from the probe tip
via the dot to the medium. This heating causes the multi-
layer structure of a dot to be destroyed and as a result the
easy axis of magnetisation rotates into the medium. The
data stored by magnetic write operations is lost. Now,
we have a third way of representing data, indicated by
the letter H (for heated), and effectuated by the ewb op-
eration. (We will also indicate un-heated bits by the letter
U ). The bottom half of Figure 1 shows that the layered
structure of the last dot is permanently destroyed. The
peak in the magnetic read signal for the last bit has dis-
appeared. The electrical write bit operation ewb is an
irreversible process, which can only change a 0/1 bit into
a H , as shown by the one-way transitions from the states
0 and 1 in the top half of Figure 2 to the state H . (See
Section 7 for detail on the physics.)
Strictly speaking there is no electrical read bit oper-
ation erb; instead erb is built out of magnetic read and
write operations. The operation erb detects the pres-
ence or absence of an out-of-plane dot by performing an
atomic sequence of mrb and mwb operations as follows:
1. mrb to read the original bit;
2. mwb to write the inverse of the original bit;
3. mrb of the inverse to verify that the inverse can in-
deed be read back;
4. mwb to write the original again;
5. mrb to verify that the original can indeed be read
back.
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Block Bit number Purpose
0 1 . . . 4094 4095
0 HU /UH . . . HU /UH hash+meta.
1 0/1 0/1 . . . 0/1 0/1 512B data
2 0/1 0/1 . . . 0/1 0/1 512B data
.
.
.
2
N − 1 0/1 0/1 . . . 0/1 0/1 512B data
Figure 3: Sample medium layout of a heated line of 512
bytes=4096 bits each. 0/1 represents a magnetically writ-
ten bit, HU represents an electrically written, Manch-
ester encoded logical 0 and UH represents a logical 1.
If any of the two verification steps fail we assume that
the dot has lost its out-of-plane property and let the elec-
trical read operation erb returnH , else erb returnsU (the
two inversions ensure that the original magnetic data is
restored for dots that have not been heated).
The erb operation is at least 5 times slower than mrb,
and ewb is also slower than mwb because of the local
heating process. Therefore, as stated before, the idea is
to use the erb and ewb operations sparingly.
As illustrated in Figure 2 (bottom right), applying a
single mrb operation to an electrically written bit would
yield a more or less random result. To avoid this, the
device must follow the proper protocol which means that
magnetically written data must only be read magnetically
and that electrically written data must only be read elec-
trically. A simple way to achieve this is by reserving spe-
cific physical areas for electrical data while using other
areas for magnetic data. As we shall see below, this rigid
segregation of electrical and magnetic data puts severe
constraints on the design of the device and the file sys-
tem. An alternative would be to read the in-plane mag-
netic signal directly, however, this requires carefully con-
structed elliptic dots to ensure that the direction of the
in-plane magnetization is known (See Section 7).
Sector operations Following Pozidis et al. [39] we as-
sume that a sector has a standard size of 512 bytes and
about 15% sector overhead for the sector header, error
correction, and cyclic redundancy check. This allows us
to build a magnetic read sector operation mrs and a mag-
netic write sector operation mws using the magnetic read
and write operations for bits described above, and tak-
ing error correction appropriate to the medium, the tips,
etc. into account. Henceforth we will talk about a block
as the smallest unit of storage, and for simplicity we as-
sume that a block is a single sector. Similarly we can
build an electrical read sector operation ers and an elec-
trical write sector operation ews using the electrical read
and write operations for bits described above.
Heat a line Assume that at a certain moment some ex-
isting data must be heated, after which the data cannot
be destroyed without leaving a trace. Our heat operation
works on a line, which is a sequence of 2N contiguous
blocks aligned on a 2N boundary. When given a line, the
heat operation performs the following atomic sequence
of steps:
1. Read blocks 1 . . . 2N − 1 representing the line to be
protected using 2N − 1 calls to mrs;
2. Calculate a secure hash (e.g., SHA-256) of the
blocks and their addresses just read;
3. Write the 512-bit Manchester encoding of the 256-
bit hash in block 0 using the electrical write oper-
ation ews, this leaves 4096-512=3584 bits of space
for meta data, signatures, etc.;
4. Check that the hash can be read back using ers, or
else fail.
All lines can be heated individually, thus providing
significant flexibility over WORM-based approaches.
Blocks 1 . . . 2N−1 of a heated line can still be read mag-
netically, hence efficiently, and as often as needed. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the result of the heat operation. The last
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N − 1 blocks are written magnetically, shown as zeros
and ones. Block 0 is written electrically in a Manchester
encoding, where each logical bit of the hash occupies
two physical bits on the medium. The Manchester en-
coding ensures that a heated bit (i.e., an H) has at most
one heated neighbour. Since each electrical write may be
expected to have a detrimental effect on the neighbouring
bits, spreading out heated bits is good for reliability.
The heat operation, when applied to a line that has
already been heated either has no effect and is therefore
harmless (if the data in block 0 is invariant) or it will
turn Manchester encoded bits into HH , thus providing
evidence of tampering.
Verify a heated line The verify operation computes
the hash of a line and compares the computed hash to
the electrically written hash. A mismatch represents evi-
dence of tampering.
Addressing Modern disks offer a uniform method of
accessing blocks by logical block address, rather than
by physical block addresses (which may vary wildly be-
tween devices), and automatic bad block handling by the
device offers the file system the abstraction of a reliable
device. However, to be tamper-evident we must know
exactly where to look for evidence of tampering. This
means that a SERO device and the SERO file system
should use physical block addresses (PBA) rather than
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logical block addresses (LBA) so that we know exactly
at which PBA to look for heated hashes. Bad block han-
dling is a challenge, because a heated block should not
be misinterpreted as a bad block. If the disk exposes its
physical layout to the file system, the file system should
be able to recognize when data is in the right place.
4 File system
Having described a SERO device that can make a line
RO by heating the line, we discuss the main questions
that the designer of a file system must address to serve
such a device. The main question that we wish to pose is
what properties a high performance, tamper-evident file
system should have so that it can serve a SERO device.
We will explore the performance issues first, followed by
the tamper evidence issues.
4.1 SERO file system performance
Standard hard disk WMRM storage offers high data rates
and low access times, whereas WORM storage typically
has higher access times (especially when tape or disk
robots are involved), and lower data rates than WMRM.
A SERO mass storage device combines the two classes
of use in one device, which poses a challenge to the de-
vice and the file system not to degrade the performance
of WMRM operations due to the presence of RO lines.
The two types of storage are normally served by differ-
ent file systems, whereas a SERO device could probably
be served better by a single file system.
As a SERO device ages, slowly but surely parts of the
storage become RO, such that the WMRM area not only
shrinks but it might also become fragmented. Consider-
ing that it does not make sense to move a RO line (be-
cause this would not leave behind usable space), the file
system has an important task in avoiding fragmentation
of heated lines.
Interestingly, part of the answer to the question we
posed at the beginning of this section is provided by
Rosenblum and Ousterhout, who observe that when the
read cache is large enough, disk I/O is dominated by
writes. Therefore, the disk has the best chance of keep-
ing up with the CPU if writes are clustered [42]. Many
file systems have since been proposed that cluster writes.
From a write performance point of view it makes no dif-
ference whether the blocks in a cluster are related, for in-
stance when the blocks are part of the same file or when
the blocks are unrelated. However, from the SERO point
of view it does make a difference whether blocks are re-
lated, because it does not make sense to heat a line of
unrelated blocks. In the end, it depends on the applica-
tion whether or not clusters of related blocks are likely
to occur. For instance, taking a data base snapshot would
probably result in a cluster of related blocks.
So why does clustering help our SERO device? Clus-
tering makes it possible to take a contiguous sequence of
related blocks, to hash the data stored in those blocks,
and to use the WO operation to store the hash of the
sequence. The advantages of clustering are twofold.
Firstly, the larger the cluster, the lower the overhead of
the hash can be. Secondly, the WO operation is expected
to be considerably slower than the WM operation, and
clustering allows the WO operation to be used sparingly.
We will now have a closer look at the original log-
structured file system [42]. LFS treats the space on
the disk as a collection of contiguous segments, each of
which consists of a contiguous sequence of blocks. This
collection of segments is called the log. New data is writ-
ten sequentially to the log and the log is filled incremen-
tally.
An LFS has to manage data blocks and free blocks on
the storage device, while keeping the performance of the
disk as high as possible. To achieve this performance
goal, it (1) accumulates small writes and commits them
to the disk in a single operation, and (2) gathers related
but scattered blocks, removing dirty blocks by running
the garbage collector.
The presence of heated lines complicates the tasks of
the LFS. This is because once a line has been heated it
cannot be copied by the garbage collector, since a heated
line leaves no reusable space behind. Copying a heated
line just decreases the free space that can be potentially
used for new data. Therefore, like clustering of related
blocks, heated lines should also be clustered.
Based on the behaviour of the application, it should be
possible to predict which lines will be heated at the same
time. Therefore, during garbage collection, the file sys-
tem may cluster lines into segments, that are likely to be
heated at the same time. As a result of such a cluster-
ing policy, the file system creates a bimodal distribution
of heated segments; that is we have only mostly heated
segments and mostly unheated segments. As a result, (1)
the performance of reading/writing blocks should not be
affected much, since heated lines and WMRM live data
blocks are kept separate, (2) space decreases only if new
data is written and not when lines are heated, since lines
are heated in the right place, avoiding the need to copy
them, and (3) the garbage collector skips over heated
segments, avoiding reading and writing them repeatedly,
thus saving on disk bandwidth. Summarizing, the bi-
modality should help to keep the performance high in
the presence of heated lines.
Other file systems do not use a log, but pack data into
clusters. For example, the Berkeley Fast File Systems
(FFS) [44] uses clusters to pack small files with their
metadata, or to pack related blocks of large files into the
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same cluster. The discussion above on bimodality holds
for these file systems as well; FFS-like clustering poli-
cies should maintain mostly heated clusters and mostly
unheated clusters.
4.2 SERO file system tamper evidence
The second part of the answer to the question we posed
at the beginning of this section is provided by a number
of proposals that hash disk blocks to provide tamper evi-
dence.
So why does hashing help to protect the integrity of the
data? Basically because it is easy to compute a hash from
a group of disk blocks, while it is hard to find another set
of disk blocks with the specific hash. We discuss two file
systems for archival storage that use hashes extensively.
The first builds an index structure from the leaves up, and
the second builds the index from the root down.
Venti [40] uses a secure hash as the address of a node,
where a node consists of a block of data or hashes. Venti
builds a hierarchy of nodes from the leaves upwards by
storing the hashes of the children of a node in the parent.
The hash of the root node represents the entire hierarchy.
As long as the hash of the root is stored securely, tamper-
ing can be detected. To check a node we use the hash of
the node as its address, then re-compute the hash of the
node, and finally compare the computed hash to the ad-
dress. A computed hash that does not match the address
of the node presents evidence of tampering.
A SERO device would be appropriate to keep the hash
of a node secure. For simplicity, assume that the gran-
ularity of a node in the Venti hierarchy is a line. Then
heating the line that represents a node is sufficient to cal-
culate and store the hash of the line RO. The most rel-
evant node to be heated is the root node, because this
protects the entire hierarchy.
Venti lays different hierarchies on the data blocks to be
able to record different snapshots of the file system (for
example one for every working day). The same idea can
also be used to construct hierarchies for different sub-
sets of the data, such as the data accessible to different
users, of different projects, etc. This would offer fine
grained protection. However, the more nodes are heated,
the more WMRM space on the medium is reduced to RO
space, thus resulting in a reduction in usability.
A fossilised index [57] builds a tree from the root
downwards. To insert a new node in the tree we start
at the root, visiting all nodes down to a leaf until a free
slot is found in which the hash of the new node can be
inserted. The hash of the node completely determines
which slot in an existing node must be used, and what
path to traverse. The tamper evidence guarantee of the
fossilised index relies on the assumption that once all the
slots of a node have been filled, the storage device en-
sures that the node becomes RO, for example by copying
it to a WORM device.
A SERO device would provide appropriate support
for a fossilised index as it makes copying the completed
node to the WORM unnecessary. Again, assuming that
a node fits in a line, a completely filled node is simply
heated.
5 Security analysis
Triggered by large corporate scandals in the recent past,
Hsu and Ong [19] propose the following threat model for
secure storage. Assume that a powerful attacker (i.e., a
disgruntled employee, or a dishonest CEO) regrets the
existence of a certain stored record, and that he wishes
history to be rewritten by tampering with the storage sys-
tem so that it “forgets” the record. The attacker can do
this either by overwriting or erasing the record, or by
masking the existence of the record by overwriting or
erasing the index. We assume that the attacker would
not like to draw attention to his actions, for instance by
removing or physically destroying the storage system or
parts thereof, and that the attacker would like to cover his
tracks.
In terms of the threat model of Hasan et al. [14], the
attacker capability is that of a powerful insider wield-
ing influence over systems and the personnel responsible
for the systems. The attacker has root permission on all
systems connected to the storage device. The asset goal
is the integrity and availability of specific files that the
attacker wishes to compromise. The access entry point
is the whole system stack including direct access to the
storage device. The attacker is expected to be able to dis-
connect the storage device temporarily from the system,
then to connect it to a laptop with the appropriate inter-
face for a limited period of time, and after he has finished
to reconnect the device to the system.
This threat model represents a formidable challenge
to the design of any secure storage system. For example
some of the existing commercial WORM-based storage
systems make it difficult to tamper with data, but on most
systems tampering cannot be detected. We are not able to
prevent tampering either, but we are able to detect tam-
pering. We believe this to be a significant step towards
addressing the challenge of secure storage.
WORM storage is geared towards providing integrity
and availability. Therefore we will analyse to what ex-
tent our SERO system can cope with threats on integrity
and availability. To ensure confidentiality or authentic-
ity cryptographic techniques should be used, but this is
beyond the scope of our paper.
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5.1 Integrity
Assume that the attacker issues a write command, ei-
ther indirectly via the file system (which is easy) or di-
rectly, to the device (which is harder) to alter a heated
file. (Files that have not been heated are trivial to attack
and are therefore beyond the scope of the security analy-
sis.) Then there are four possibilities.
• mwb hash: Changing the magnetisation of an elec-
trically written bit of the hash has no effect, as only
the presence or the absence of a magnetic dot is rel-
evant for a heated hash.
• mwb inode/data: Changing the magnetisation of a
magnetically written bit of the data is detected by
the verify operation as evidence of tampering.
• ewb hash: The only changes possible to an electri-
cally written hash are UH → HH or HU → HH .
HH is an illegal code, and thus represents evidence
of tampering.
• ewb inode/data: Data is read magnetically, so an
electrically written bit in the data, which destroys
the magnetic properties of the relevant dot, appears
as a read error. However, a more subtle attack
would be an attempt to split a file or to coalesce
two files. To illustrate such an attack imagine a
heated file as shown below, where the data block dp
is carefully crafted to look like a valid hash h′ and
where the data block dp+1 looks like a valid inode
i′:
before: h i d0 . . . dp−1 dp dp+1 . . . dq
after: h i d0 . . . dp−1 h′ i′ . . . dq
Assume that when instructed to heat the file
with inode dp+1 = i′, the device has no way of
telling whether this is a true file, or just part of
the data of another file. Hence after heating, the
original file with inode i would appear corrupted
whereas the new file with inode i′ appears to be
genuine, quite the contrary of what we expect.
Similarly, if the hashes are not in well-defined
locations it is possible to coalesce two files making
the result look genuine instead of the original. To
prevent splitting or coalescing attacks, the device
insists that hashes are written at known physical
addresses.
In all four cases either the attempt to interfere with the
integrity of the data is detected or the integrity is main-
tained.
5.2 Availability
As stated in the threat model, the device (or parts thereof)
is not assumed to be taken off line for extended periods
of time, or to be removed entirely. Therefore, the only
way in which the availability of a file can be affected is
when the access path to a heated file is blocked, or when
another file masks the desired file.
Assume that the attacker tries to delete a heated file us-
ing the rm command. This removes the directory entry
and tries to decrement the reference count in the inode.
This implies writing the inode, which will be tamper-
evident because the hash is invalidated. (Incidentally, it
will not be possible to use the ln command on a heated
file either, as this would increase the reference count in
the inode.) A possible protection against malicious use
of the rm command would be to maintain the directory
as a fossilised index [57].
Assume that the attacker would like to create an exact
copy of file to mask the existence of the original. This
cannot be done since the physical addresses of the blocks
are included in the calculation of the hash. Therefore, a
copy can always be distinguished from an original.
Assume that the attacker clears the directory structure,
then a fsck style scan of the medium would definitely
recover (albeit slowly) all the heated files.
Assume that the attacker clears the entire medium, for
example using a bulk eraser. If done properly [12], this
would clear all magnetically written information. How-
ever all electrically written information is still present,
thus providing the required evidence of tampering.
There are many attacks possible that our system can-
not detect. For example assume that an attacker creates a
new file with data that conflicts with the file the attacker
wishes to remove. Firstly, the notion of conflicting data
is a semantic notion that can only be resolved by the ap-
plication. Secondly, this is not an attack on the integrity
of the file per se (as the original remains untouched), but
an attack on the authenticity. To prevent such attacks,
cryptographic means are needed.
This concludes the preliminary security evaluation of
the system, and also the speculative part of the paper. The
next two sections describe the components of a SERO
device and experimental evidence that heating is a feasi-
ble WO operation.
6 Probe storage on a patterned medium
A patterned medium needs an actuator, appropriate
read/write heads, etc. to access the medium; a probe stor-
age device would be highly suitable for this purpose. We
discuss as an example the Twente Micro Scanning Probe
Array Memory (µSPAM) (Figure 4), which is made out
of two or more silicon wafers bonded to each other. One
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500 nm 500 nm
Figure 5: Scanning Electron Microscopy (left, 500 nm pitch) and Magnetic Force Microscopy image (right, 200 nm
pitch) of two different patterned media. In the SEM image, the dots are still covered by a thick resist layer, and SEM
images have a long depth of focus which gives the illusion that the dots are elliptic, whereas in reality they are not.
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Figure 4: Principle of probe-based storage [39]. The sys-
tem consists of two components, which are mounted on
top of each other – one with the recording medium and
the actuator, the other with the read/write probe array and
the electronics.
half contains the (magnetic) medium. An electrostatic
stepper actuator, such as the µWalker [48] or Harmonica
drive [43] is used to move the medium. The other half
consists of one large array of probes.
The patterned medium The medium for the µSPAM
is a regular matrix of magnetic single domain dots. Such
a discrete medium is expected to be able to support
higher bit densities compared to the continuous polycrys-
talline medium used in the hard disk today [51].
A matrix with a period of 200 nm can be achieved [53].
A scanning electron microscope and magnetic image is
shown in Figure 7. An improved setup with periodicities
down to 150 nm has recently been realised [25], and a
period of 100 nm (being 50 nm dot size and 50 nm spac-
patterned magnetic medium
external field
READ WRITE
cantilever
tip plane
tip
Figure 6: The principle of an MFM-measurement
ing) should be achievable. This will give a capacity of 10
Gbit/cm2 (=65 Gbit/inch2).
The probes For reading, the µSPAM uses the MFM
(Magnetic Force Microscopy)-principle [38]. An MFM-
probe is made by placing a small magnetic element, the
tip, on a cantilever spring. Typical dimensions are a can-
tilever length of 200 µm, element length of 4 µm and
diameter of 50 nm and a distance from the surface of 30
nm.
Figure 6 shows the principle of an MFM-
measurement. The magnetic tip is attracted or repelled,
depending on the stray field of the medium. The tip
is affected by the magnetic orientation of a dot. The
displacement of the cantilever might be measured by
means of the change in capacity between the cantilever
and the medium. Bits can be written by the combined
field of the magnetic tip on one side of the medium and
an externally applied field generated by a coil placed on
the other side of the medium [53].
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Figure 7: Perpendicular anisotropy as a function of the
heating temperature
7 Heating changes magnetic properties
To support the heat operation, it should be possible to de-
stroy the out-of-plane magnetic property of the dots. For
this we need to discuss in more detail the internal struc-
ture of a dot and its relation to the magnetic properties.
The magnetic field energy is minimal when the mag-
netisation lies in the long axis of an object. The preferen-
tial direction of magnetisation in a needle is for instance
along the needle, and not perpendicular to it. Since our
dots are circular disks with a diameter much larger than
the thickness, the magnetisation prefers to lie within the
plane of the disk in the absence of any other energy con-
tributions. The fact that the energy depends on the ori-
entation of the magnetisation is called anisotropy. The
preferred direction is called an easy axis. In the case of
a dot which is perfectly circular, we speak of an easy
plane. Normally dots will not be exactly circular, but
elliptic. The magnetisation of the dot will prefer to lay
in-plane along the long axis of the dot. By intentionally
realising elliptic dots with their long axis along the track
direction [32], data detection will be more robust and one
can even imagine writing data into damaged dots (See the
discussion of the erb operation in Section 3). Since the
anisotropy is low, data density cannot be high however.
In any case, magnetic dots with a diameter larger than
their thickness will a priori have an in-plane easy axis.
For our system to work, we initially need dots with a
perpendicular easy axis. Therefore a second strong en-
ergy contribution is needed to overcome the stray field
energy and force the magnetisation perpendicular to the
dot. This second energy term originates from the asym-
metric arrangement of the atoms in the dot. In con-
ventional perpendicular hard disk media, specific crystal
structures are used to induce perpendicular anisotropy.
These can however not easily be destroyed. In our case
therefore we use interface properties. The magnetic ma-
Figure 8: X-ray diffraction under a low angle of two sam-
ples, one with (labelled: Annealed) and one without an-
nealing (labelled: As grown).
terial used in the dots consists of a stack of extremely thin
Co and Pt layers, each no more than 1 nm thick [53]. The
interfaces between the Co and Pt films cause anisotropy
with the easy axis perpendicular to the interfaces.
Due to the delicate structure of these films, they
do not support high temperatures over long periods of
time. Above a certain temperature, the interface between
the Co and Pt mixes, and the perpendicular interface
anisotropy is destroyed. As a result the easy axis of mag-
netisation rotates back into the film plane. This is an
irreversible process. After heat treatment, the interfaces
cannot be restored.
To determine at which temperature interface mixing
occurs, we have measured the anisotropy constant K
of samples subjected to six different temperatures. The
anisotropy constants were calculated by a Fourier trans-
formation of the torque curve obtained with an applied
field of 1350 kA/m. Figure 7 shows the dependence of
the anisotropy value as a function of the heating, or an-
nealing, temperature. (In materials science it is common
to use the word annealing rather than heating, since it
describes the proces rather than the method.)
The perpendicular anisotropy of the unannealed film
is 80 kJ/m3. This value is maintained up to an annealing
temperature of 500 ◦C. Above 600 ◦C the value of K
drops dramatically. This means that for this particular
film, heating temperatures over 500 ◦C will be required
for permanent modification of the magnetic properties.
To investigate what happens to the interface between
the Co and Pt in the films, we performed X-ray diffrac-
tion experiments. In this method the film is exposed to
a non-destructive X-ray. The beam penetrates metals,
and reflects from discontinuities such as atomic crystal
planes or film interfaces. By varying the angle of inci-
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Figure 9: X-ray diffraction under a high angle of the
same two samples as for low angle XRD, with annealing
(labelled: Annealed) and without annealing (labelled: As
grown).
dence, reflections from parallel planes at specific spacing
add up and we observe a peak in the reflected intensity.
In conventional operation (at high angles of incidence, so
we observe spacings in the order of Angstroms), we can
therefore determine the crystal structure of the film. At
low angle of incidence we are sensitive to much larger
spacing (1 nm) and we can observe the multilayer struc-
ture. The unannealed sample and a sample annealed at
700 ◦C were investigated by low angle X-ray diffraction
(XRD) (Figure 8). A peak around 8 degrees on the 2
θ axis is visible on the sample without annealing. This
peak is due to the periodicity of the Co and Pt multilay-
ers. From this angle, we can calculate that layer has a
thickness of 0.6 nm. In the annealed sample, this peak
has disappeared, which clearly shows that after an an-
nealing treatment at a temperature higher than 600 ◦C,
the interfaces have mixed, the perpendicular anisotropy
is lost and the out-of-plane magnetic properties of the
film are destroyed.
One might worry that by heating the interfaces are de-
stroyed, but crystal structures are formed which induce
perpendicular anisotropy. To study the change in crystal
structure, we measured the samples by high-angle-XRD,
so that we are sensitive to Angstrom spacing (Figure 9).
In the annealed sample, we can find a strong reflection
peak around 41.7 degrees in the 2 θ axis. This peak can
be characterized to a specific Co-Pt (111) crystal plane
(face centered cubic, fcc). It suggests that indeed a new
crystalline structure of fct Co-Pt was formed in the film.
This crystal exhibits however magnetic anisotropy in the
[001] direction, i.e., there are tilted magnetic easy axes
in the film (not perpendicular, not in plane). So there
is no risk that after excessive heating the perpendicular
anisotropy can be restored by crystallisation.
We envisage that heating of the magnetic dots will be
realised by passing a current from the probe tip to the dot.
It has been shown in earlier work that these currents are
even capable of evaporating the material, so the energy
density is sufficiently high [36, 35]. This method is not
only limited to probe storage however. Active research is
being performed into hard disks with heat assisted writ-
ing strategies [28]. It is not fundamentally impossible
that the supplied energy can be high enough to modify
the magnetic properties of the disk permanently. In prin-
ciple this method could therefore also be used in mag-
netic disk drives, although the implementation would be
far more difficult.
More research will be needed to determine the time re-
quired, the amount of energy dissipated, the wear on the
tip, and the effect of heating one dot on the neighbour-
ing dots. Especially the last effect could be detrimental,
since the magnetic state, or even the write-ability of the
adjacent dot could be affected. However, it is not un-
likely that by tailoring the materials and layer structures,
the interface mixing temperature can be reduced, which
will reduce the risk of thermal erasure of the neighbour-
ing dots. Furthermore, by properly designing the ther-
mal properties of the dot and the substrate, most of the
heat can be conducted away into the substrate, rather than
dissipating away laterally, like is done in magneto-optic
medium [29]. In this way the heated area can be lim-
ited and damage to adjacent dots can be reduced. In any
case it will be necessary to use the write-once operation
sparingly.
8 Discussion
We have described an experiment in material science and
discussed a number of questions about how probe-based
storage on a patterned medium can be used to build a
tamper-evident storage device and file system. The ex-
periments and discussion raise many more issues that
must be addressed in future work. We describe the most
relevant questions below.
Efficiency The storage efficiency of the system merits
some discussion. Firstly, we have explained the low level
system operations using a simple Manchester encoding
for the hash. For large N the amount of space wasted is
negligible (1 block out of 2N ), but the price to pay is lack
of flexibility. For small values of N we could employ
more efficient coding techniques [33].
Secondly, the storage system as we have described it
behaves as mass storage that can be read and written any
number of times as one would expect, except that once an
area has been heated, it can no longer be rewritten with
impunity. This means that over the lifetime of the device,
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the read/write area gradually shrinks, and the read-only
area grows, until the device has become a pure read-only
device. The medium can safely be decommissioned by
the time all data has expired. This means that the life-
time of the data must be matched to the lifetime of the
medium.
Deletion Once heated, data will remain until the
medium is decommissioned. This is not desirable if there
is a large variation in the lifetime of the data, particularly
in cases where retention periods are carefully controlled
by regulation. There are several ways to deal with this
problem. Firstly, data could be written encrypted, dis-
posing of the encryption key as soon as the expiry date of
the data is reached [8]. Secondly, it is possible to imple-
ment a physical shred operation on the device (similar to
what has been achieved for optical storage [45]), which
in our case would physically destroy the expired data by
precise local heating. However, both approaches are vul-
nerable to attacks by a dishonest CEO and as such not
wholly satisfactory. We would advocate data to be seg-
regated by expiry date, thus making it possible to take
a device physically out of service. Given the enormous
volume of data subject to compliance regulation [54] this
should be possible to arrange.
Forensics A typical server is responsible for so much
data that the traditional disk imaging approach, which
copies an entire disk at the lowest level possible (i.e.,
including unused and bad blocks), is becoming infea-
sible. Firstly the volume of data may be prohibitively
large, and secondly, to image the disks the server must
be stopped, possibly for hours, thus losing valuable pro-
duction time. Live forensics methods [1] would benefit
from a storage device that can be instructed to heat evi-
dence without having to copy it. One of the most difficult
problems in this field is to speed up the collection of ev-
idence [9] in a kind of digital evidence bag. Our heated
files could be the basis of such an evidence bag. It should
be kept in mind that a forensic investigation carried out
by the police is relatively rare, and probably still requires
whole disk imaging. A forensic investigation by com-
pany staff is more common, since companies will try to
deal with the problems such as harassment, and theft in
house. Problems such as child pornography and money
laundering must always be reported to the police [13].
We are confident that even a skilled focused ion beam
(FIB) operator would find it difficult to reconstruct a per-
fect out-of-plane dot because she would have to remove
the debris of an in-plane dot first, and then deposit sev-
eral thin Co and Pt layers in a sub-micron area with the
correct delicate layer structure to obtain perpendicular
anisotropy, just to reconstruct one dot. Using magnetic
imaging techniques [27], a forensics team would proba-
bly have no difficulty identifying a reconstructed out-of-
plane dot from an original out-of-plane dot.
Tamper-evident storage as a building block Our sys-
tem offers tamper-evident storage, which could be used
as a building block in other systems. For example the
idea of self-securing storage [47] takes the view that the
storage system should place only limited trust in the host
that controls it, since the host is more likely to become
compromised than the storage system. Thus the stor-
age system itself maintains a log of the instructions it is
given, and ensures that earlier versions of any file (within
a given time window) can be recovered. Our approach
could strengthen the defences of a self-securing storage
device because the logs can be heated.
9 Conclusions and future work
Probe storage on patterned media is a promising tech-
nology for developing tamper-evident storage. The ca-
pacity of such devices will be huge, and the tamper ev-
idence is good. The measurements reported in the pa-
per demonstrate that in principle it is possible to use a
patterned magnetic medium in two essentially different
ways: for normal read-write purposes and for read-only
purposes after the data has been heated. It is physically
impossible to alter the data without being detected after
the heat operation has been used. We discuss the main
issues that must be addressed when designing a device
and a file system for tamper-evident SERO storage. The
strong point of the SERO approach is its combination of
the advantages of WORM storage with the advantages of
WMRM storage.
We have identified the most relevant issues in the de-
sign of the system. However, much work remains to be
done. On the software side we plan to design and build a
simulation of the device and the file system, such that we
can study the performance/security tradeoffs. The next
step would be to develop a time-accurate emulator for
the device, as well as an implementation of the file sys-
tem to validate the simulation results. The time-accurate
emulator could probably be built using anti-fuse based
write once semiconductor memory technology as used in
FPGAs. On the hardware side we plan to develop mate-
rials that change magnetic properties by interface mixing
at lower temperatures, and tips that generate enough heat
for interface mixing, studying the efficiency and reliabil-
ity of the mechanisms involved.
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